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II. STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
A. Nature of the Case 
1.) The issue to be resolved on this appeal is whether the Honorable Dane H. Watkins 
erred in reversing Judge Charles L. Roos's Order of Dismissal pursuant to I.C. § 19-3501(4) and 
its constitutional counterparts. 
2.) Appellant Brett 1. Jacobson's ("Jacobson") position is that such error was 
committed because the State failed to meet its burden of proving the requisite good cause to 
justify the over six month delay from the date Jacobson plead not guilty, to the time of triaL The 
following are the key factors that substantiate the foregoing point: (a) Jacobson twice invoked his 
speedy trial rights and did so at the earliest possible moment in the proceedings; I (b) the reason 
for the delay was Court error, as admitted thereby, and Jacobson did nothing to cause or 
1 State v. Clark, 135 Idaho 255,260,16 P.3d 931,936 (2000) ("[I]fthe defendant has 
demanded a speedy trial ... a stronger reason is necessary to constitute good cause"); See also 
State v. Moore, 148 Idaho 887, 902, 231 P.3d 532,547 (Ct. App. 2010) (A defendanfs assertion 
of his or her right to a speedy trial is "entitled to strong evidentiary weight in determining 
whether the defendant is being deprived of the right") (emphasis added) (citations omitted); 
See also State v. Lopez, 144 Idaho 349, 353, 160 P.3d 1284, 1288 (Ct. App. 2007) (,'[T]he timing 
of a defendanf s assertion of the right tends to disclose whether a defendant actually desired a 
speedy trial, and is closely related to and affects other Barker factors, including prejudice and 




precipitate any delay in the proceedings;2 (c) no continuances were requested and no speedy trial 
waivers were executed; and (d) most importantly, the prosecution offered no excuse or 
justification, whether legitimate or not, as to why it was unable to bring Jacobson to trial in 
Custer County within six months of his first not guilty plea or even within six months of 
Jacobson's second not guilty plea, via counsel. 
3.) For the reasons set forth herein, Jacobson respectfully requests that this Court 
AFFIRM Judge Roos's Order of Dismissal and REVERSE Judge Watkins' Memorandum 
Decision Re: Appeal and Order Re: Appeal. 
B. Statement of Facts and Course of Proceedings 
4.) On or about June 28,2010, Jacobson was issued citations for Driving Under the 
Influence (I.C. § 18-8004), Possession of a Controlled Substance (I.C. § 37-2732), and 
Possession of Drug Paraphernalia (I.e. § 37-2734A(1)). 
2 State v. McKeeth, 136 Idaho 619, 627, 38 P.3d 1275, 1287 (Ct. App. 2001) ("The 
ultimate responsibility for the delay must rest with the government rather than with the 
defendant"). Compare Lopez, 144 Idaho at 354, 160 P.3d at 1289 {"The district court apparently 
accepted the State's position, holding that the court's overcrowded calendar was a neutral factor 
and would not be weighed against either party. The district court erred in this conclusion oflaw. 
The duty to bring a defendant to trial lies with the State, not the defendant. The prosecution and 
the trial court have the primary burden to ensure that cases are brought to trial in a timely 
matter") with Memorandum Decision Re Appeal, p. 7, fn.4 ("It is clear to this Court that the 
mistake by the Magistrate that caused the delay was a neutral reason.... At oral argument, this 
Court inquired of the parties on the issue of whether mistake was the fault of the software or 




5.) An arraignment was held on the same day before the Honorable Charles L. Roos. 
Jacobson appeared in person and entered a plea of "not guilty" on the record to each of the 
foregoing charges. No trial date was set at the arraignment. 
6.) Thereafter, on July 7, 2010, the undersigned entered a notice of appearance on 
behalf of Jacobson, entered yet another not guilty plea, and specifically demanded a speedy trial. 
Jacobson also demanded a sworn complaint. 
7.) Despite entering two (2) not guilty pleas and making a formal request for speedy 
trial, the State failed to bring Jacobson to trial within the timeframe elucidated in I.e. § 19-3501. 
Specifically, with regard to the first not guilty plea, six months lapsed on December 26, 2010 
(the trial was set for January 14, 2011); regarding the second not guilty plea, six months lapsed 
on January 3, 2011. Accordingly, whether the six months is calculated from the first or second 
not guilty plea, the State was in dereliction ofLe. § 19-3501(4). 
8.) On January 4, 2011, Jacobson filed a Motion to Dismiss, the Affidavit of 
Alexander P. McLaughlin in Support of Motion to Dismiss, and a Memorandum in Support of 
Motion to Dismiss. 
9.) A telephonic hearing on the foregoing motion was held on January 7, 2011. The 
Court granted Jacobson's motion. 
10.) As to the Court's reasoning, at the hearing, Judge Roos stated that the timeframe 
to calculate speedy trial commenced on June 28, 2010, when Jacobson first entered a plea of not 




least December 26, 2010 nearly three (3) weeks from the January 14, 2011, date on which the 
trial was to be held. 
11.) As is required, Judge Roos's analysis focused on the reason for the delay. 
According to the Court, when a not guilty plea is entered, ISTARS automatically provides a trial 
date to the Court within the timeframe for speedy trial based upon the date ofthe not guilty plea. 
12.) However, in this instance, the Court entered a trial date based upon the time the 
sworn complaint was entered not from either of Jacobson's not guilty pleas. Recognizing that 
the time of filing a sworn complaint has no bearing on speedy trial, the Court took the blame for 
failing to schedule Jacobson's trial within the required timeframe. 
13.) The Court then entered its Order of Dismissal and the State appealed. 
14.) On July 6, 2011, Judge Dane H. Watkins issued a Memorandum Decision Re: 
Appeal and reversed Judge Roos. Judge Watkins' conclusions are summarized on page nine (9) 
of the decision: 
Although Defendant, consistently and early in the proceedings, 
asserted his right to a speedy trial, this Court concludes that 
under the constitutional balancing test, a non-prejudicial delay 
of less than three weeks did not violate Defendant's right to a 
speedy trial. 
Memorandum Decision Re: Appeal, p. 9 (emphasis added). 
15.) Why the District Court relied on the "constitutional balancing test," is somewhat 
perplexing. Jacobson"s moving papers and briefing made it quite clear that the primary basis of 




16.) In any event, the District Court reversed Judge Roos and entered its Order Re: 
Appeal. 
17.) On August 8, 2011, Jacobson timely filed a Notice of Appeal. Thereafter, an 
Amended Notice of Appeal was likewise filed. Jacobson now submits this brief in support of his 
appeal. 
III. ISSUE ON APPEAL 
Did Judge Watkins commit legal error in his application ofLe. § 19-3501 to the facts of 
this case? 
IV. STANDARD OF REVIEW 
The appropriate standard of review is stated in State v. Moore: 
Whether there was an infringement of a defendant's right to a 
speedy trial presents a mixed question of law and fact. While we 
defer to the trial court's findings of fact if supported by substantial 
and competent evidence, we exercise free review of the trial 
court's conclusions oflaw. 
148 Idaho at 899, 231 P.3d at 544. 
V. ARGUMENT 
A. This Court should reverse Judge Watkins because the State failed to bring Jacobson to 
trial within six months of his not guilty plea and did not meet its burden of proving "good 
cause'- for the delay 
An accused has both a state and federal constitutional right to a speedy trial. Distinct 
therefrom is I.e. § 19-3501. The foregoing provision is more properly understood as a statutory 
right of dismissal when the time conditions of the statute are not met. See Idaho Trial Handbook 




The court, unless good cause to the contrary is shown ... must 
order the prosecution or indictment to be dismissed ... [i]f a 
defendant, charged with a misdemeanor offense, whose trial has 
not been postponed upon his application, is not brought to trial 
within six (6) months from the date that the defendant enters a plea 
of not guilty with the court. 
I.C. § 19-3501(4) (emphasis added); See also Rife v. Long, 127 Idaho 841, 848, 908 P.2d 143, 
150 (1995) ("When used in a statute, the word 'may' is permissive rather than the imperative or 
mandatory meaning of 'must' or 'shall "') (citations omitted). 
Based on its text, the legal import of the foregoing statute is clear - absent good cause, if 
a person is charged with a misdemeanor, those charges must be dismissed if the accused is not 
brought to trial within six months of his or her not guilty plea. So much was stated by our Idaho 
Supreme Court in State v. Clark: "The statute mandates that unless the State can demonstrate 
'good cause' for a delay greater than six months, the court must dismiss the case." 135 Idaho 
at 258, 16 P.3d at 934; See also State v. Dillard, 110 Idaho 834, 718 P.2d 1272 (Ct. App. 1986) 
("Our Supreme Court has indicated that when an alleged violation of the right to speedy trial is 
in issue, we should look first to determine if the statute, I.e. § 19-3501, has been abridged ... If 
the statute is applicable and there is no 'good cause' for the delay or the trial was not postponed 
at the defendant's request, then the charge against the accused must be dismissed and the inquiry 
is at an end") (cert. denied). 
As to what constitutes "good cause," this Court's discussion thereof in State v. Moore is 
instructive: 
[T]he analysis should focus upon the reason for the delay. But the 




good cause detennination may take into account the additional 
factors listed in Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514,530 (1972). Thus, 
insofar as they bear on the sufficiency or strength of the reason for 
the delay, a court may consider (1) the length of the delay; 
(2) whether the defendant asserted the right to a speedy trial; and 
(3) the prejudice to the defendant. However, the reason for the 
delay lies at the heart of a good cause detennination under 
I.e. § 19-3501. 
148 Idaho at 899, 231 P.3d at 544. Analysis of the Barker factors mandates reversal of Judge 
Watkins' Memorandum Decision Re: Appeal and Order Re: Appeal. Each factor will be 
addressed in tum. 
(a) Reason for the Delay 
This factor weighs heavily in favor of Jacobson. Judge Roos admitted that the trial court 
was the reason for the delay; both the prosecution and courts have a duty to bring defendants to 
trial in a timely fashion; the prosecution did not provide a single reason or justification as to why 
it could not bring Jacobson to trial within six months of his first or even second not guilty plea; 
and based on the fact that Jacobson repeatedly invoked his speedy trial rights and the lack of any 
evidence of court congestion or difficulty in procuring witnesses, the State's failure to bring 
Jacobson to trial was not negligent, but reckless disregard for Jacobson's statutory and 
constitutional rights. Notably, our appellate courts have stated that neither court congestion nor 
difficulty in procuring witnesses, in and of themselves, constitutes good cause. 3 Accordingly, 
3 Clark, 135 Idaho at 261, 16 P.3d at 937 ("Contrary to the magistrate's belief, this Court 
has never stated that criminal defendants do not have a speedy trial right because of court 
congestion. When examining the reasons for the delay, this Court has consistently maintained 




the situation is such that the State could not even conjure up a legally insufficient excuse to 
establish the good cause necessary to justify the delay, let alone any excuse at all. 
As stated, the reason for the delay is the heart of good cause analysis. Moore, 148 Idaho 
at 899, 231 P.3d at 544. In evaluating the reason for the delay, different weights are assigned to 
different reasons. Id. at 900, 231 P.3d at 545 (citations omitted). For example, a deliberate 
attempt to delay the trial in order to hamper the defense should be weighed heavily against the 
State. Id. A more neutral reason, such as negligence or overcrowded courts, should be weighed 
less heavily but nevertheless should be considered since the ultimate responsibility for such 
circumstances must rest with the State rather than with the defendant. Id. While not compelling 
relief in every case where a bad-faith delay would make relief virtually automatic, neither is 
negligence automatically tolerable simply because the accused cannot demonstrate exactly how 
it has prejudiced him or her. !d. Although negligence is weighed more lightly than a deliberate 
intent to harm the accused's defense, it still falls on the wrong side of the divide between 
acceptable and unacceptable reasons for delaying a criminal prosecution. Id. 
One of the issues raised on this appeal is whether the scheduling error by Judge Roos was 
a neutral reason for delay. In discussing the issue, the District Court stated that "[i]t is clear to 
this Court that the mistake by the Magistrate that caused the delay was a neutral reason." 
Memorandum Decision Re: Appeal, p. 7. This is incorrect. In State v. Lopez, supra, this Court 
since the ultimate responsibility for such circumstances must rest with the government rather 




reversed the District Court's conclusion oflaw that the trial court's crowded calendar was only a 
neutral reason for the delay and did not weigh in favor of the accused. The Court of Appeals 
offered the following reasoning in support of its position: 
The district court apparently accepted the State' s position, holding 
that the court's overcrowded calendar was a neutral factor and 
would not be weighed against either party. The district court 
erred in this conclusion of law. The duty to bring a defendant 
to trial lies with the State, not the defendant. The prosecution 
and the trial court have the primary burden to ensure that 
cases are brought to trial in a timely matter. 
Lopez, 144 Idaho at 354, 160 P .3d at 1289 (internal citations omitted) (emphasis added). 
As to case law that presents a factual scenario similar to the matter at bar, State v. Stuart, 
113 Idaho 494, 745 P.2d 1115 (Ct. App. 1987) (cited with approval in Clark, supra), is directly 
on point and is particularly instructive regarding "reason for the delay" analysis. As is the case 
here, the sole issue in Stuart was whether there was good cause under I. C. § 19-3501 to justify 
the over six month delay in bringing Mary Stuart ("Stuart") to trial. 
In Stuart, the State charged Stuart with conspiracy to deliver a controlled substance. On 
May 8, 1984, the State filed its information against Stuart. In June, a pre-trial hearing was held 
and the defense indicated that it would be filing motions to dismiss. The defense, the State, and 
the District Court all agreed not to set trial until after the motions were resolved. However, after 
the hearing, Stuart abandoned the motions. The State then moved the Court for a trial setting. 
At the hearing, the Court scheduled trial for February 25, 1985. Also at the hearing, discussion 




and/or executed. In December of 1985, Stuart moved to dismiss the case pursuant to I.C. § 19-
3501. 
At the hearing on the foregoing motion, the prosecutor attempted to justify the delay by 
stating that he had a heavy workload and that there was a change in judges in the case. The 
defense was then asked if he had been prejudiced by the delay. Counsel responded that there 
was no prejudice and that prejudice was not required to be proven under I.C. § 19-3501. The 
Court stated that good cause had been shown due to the defense's failure to follow up on the 
motions it abandoned. Stuart appealed and the Court of Appeals reversed. According to the 
Court: 
The delay here was not created by Stuart. Abandoning a motion is 
not tantamount to good cause for the delay. The reasons for delay 
asserted by the state [increased workload], were properly rejected 
by the district court. While we can appreciate the district court's 
reliance on the representation that would be pursued, we cannot 
understand why trial was not scheduled when it became clear that 
the motions had been abandoned. The six month time limitation 
for speedy trial under I.e. § 19-3501 does not represent a 
whimsical timeframe. It is designed to accommodate a reasonable 
number of pretrial motions ... Trial courts must be diligent in 
securing compliance with time restraints. It is the court's duty to 
arrange for trial ... We conclude that the court erred in failing to 
dismiss the action. 
Id. at 496, 745 P.2d at 1117. 
In the present case, the "reason for the delay" weighs heavily in favor of Jacobson. First, 
the District Court erred in ascribing a "neutral reason" to the Magistrate Court's mismanagement 
of its trial calendar. In Lopez, the Court concluded that because Courts also have a duty to bring 




neutral reason for delay, but weighs in favor of the defendant, and in this case, Jacobson. 
Moreover, the degree to which this factor weighs in favor of Jacobson is significant. This is not 
a case in which there was court congestion or difficulty in obtaining witnesses. Rather, the State 
offered no reason why it was unable to bring Jacobson to trial in a timely fashion. This failure is 
not just negligence on the part of the State it is recklessness, made all the more egregious in 
light of the fact that: (a) Jacobson repeatedly, and early on in the proceedings, demanded a 
speedy trial, and (b) the facts of the case are quite simple. In these circumstances, the reason for 
the delay cannot be not neutral. Rather, the reason for the delay, which again, is the heart of 
good cause analysis, weighs heavily in favor of Jacobson. Judge Watkins committed error by 
stating that the reason for the delay was neutral. 
Second, Stuart controls the disposition of this case. Unlike in Stuart, in the instant matter 
there was no agreement that the parties would delay setting trial until after certain motions were 
heard; there was no abandonment of such motions; there were no questionable waivers of speedy 
trial; there was no assertion that the prosecutor had a heavy workload; and there was no 
switching of presiding judges. In short, there is nothing in Jacobson's case that even closely 
resembles those circumstances present in Stuart. If the facts in Stuart do not constitute good 
cause, it is jurisprudentially impossible that the facts of this case mandate reversal of Judge 




(b) Assertion of Right to Speedy Trial 
This factor weighs heavily in favor of Jacobson. Whether a defendant invokes his or her 
right to speedy trial is entitled to strong evidentiary weight; Jacobson twice demanded a speedy 
trial; and Jacobson did so early in the proceedings. 
Although the United States Supreme Court has stated that no factor is necessarily 
determinative of a speedy trial violation, at least at the Constitutional level, it has also been said 
that the defendant's assertion of his or her right to a speedy trial is "entitled to strong evidentiary 
weight in determining whether the defendant is being deprived of the right." Moore, 
148 Idaho 902,231 P.3d at 547 (citing Barker, supra, at 531-32). So strong is this factor that in 
State v. Clark, our Idaho Supreme Court stated that regardless of the reason for the delay, where 
a defendant has specifically demanded a speedy trial, an even stronger reason is necessary to 
constitute good cause. As enunciated by the Court: 
This means that, to whatever extent the delay has been a short one, 
or the defendant has not demanded a speedy trial, or is not 
prejudiced, a weaker reason will constitute good cause. On the 
other hand, if the delay has been a long one, or if the defendant 
has demanded a speedy trial, or is prejudiced, a stronger 
reason is necessary to constitute good cause. 
Clark, 135 Idaho at 260, 16 P.3d at 936 (citations omitted) (emphasis added). Against the 
foregoing legal backdrop, for the State to prevail in this case, it must both proffer a substantial 
reason that rises to the level of legal excuse and, since Jacobson invoked his speedy trial rights 




Adding to the State's difficulty is the fact that in detennining whether good cause has 
been proven, the Court also looks to the timeliness of a defendant's invocation of his or her right 
to a speedy trial. For example, a speedy trial right invoked early in proceedings is of far more 
significance than a demand made later in the case. By way of illustration, in State v. Moore, the 
defendant did not assert his speedy trial rights until approximately sixteen months after he was 
arrested for misdemeanor DUl. After that, the defendant took nearly four months to file his brief 
on the motion and later requested that a scheduled trial date be vacated. According to the Court, 
"Moore's failure to assert his speedy trial rights until sixteen months after his arrest is a factor 
that weighs against dismissal on speedy trial grounds:' Moore, 148 Idaho at 903, 231 P.3d 
at 548. 
Similarly, in State v. Lopez, this Court stated that the lateness with which Lopez asserted 
his speedy trial rights weighed against him. In that case, Lopez did not assert his right to a 
speedy trial until he filed his motion to dismiss, which was two days before the date ultimately 
set for trial and seventeen months after he had been charged with three felonies. The Court 
concluded that: 
[t]he lateness of Lopez's assertion of his speedy trial right weighs 
heavily against his contention that the right was violated. That is, 
the timing of a defendant's assertion of the right tends to disclose 
whether a defendant actually desired a speedy trial, and is closely 
related to and affects other Barker factors, including prejudice and 
reasons for the delay. Here, the late assertion of the right weighs 
significantly against Lopez in balancing the speedy trial factors. 




In the present case, Jacobson's invocation of his speedy trial rights weighs squarely in his 
favor. First, not only did Jacobson explicitly invoke such rights, he did so on multiple occasions. 
Second, unlike in Moore and Lopez, Jacobson demanded a speedy trial at the virtual outset of 
this case. It belies common sense to think that a defendant's case should not be dismissed for a 
violation of I.e. § 19-3501, when an accused demands a speedy trial, again demands a speedy 
trial, does so at the earliest possible moment in the case, and is not brought to trial within six 
months as a result of an error by the Court and State, both of which knew that a speedy trial had 
been demanded, and neither of which came forward with any excuse, reason or justification as to 
why the defendant could not be tried in six months on a factually uncomplicated case. Simply 
stated, if there is no speedy trial violation in this case, there are no speedy trial rights in Idaho. 
(c) Length of the Delay 
This factor weighs in favor of Jacobson, but admittedly less so than the above factors. 
Regardless, the length of the delay is of less significance in statutory speedy trial analysis; the 
delay was several weeks in length; the facts of the case are not complex; and, regardless of the 
length of the delay, the State had two chances to comply with I.C. § 19-3501(4) and failed on 
both counts. 
Because of the imprecision of the right to a speedy trial, the length of delay that will 
provoke an inquiry into whether those rights have been violated is necessarily dependent upon 
the peculiar circumstances of the case. Moore, 148 Idaho at 901-02, 231 P.3d at 546-47. In 




tolerated, for the period that is reasonable for prosecution of an ordinary street cnme IS 
considerably less than for a complex conspiracy charge. Id. at 902, 231 P .3d at 547. 
In the instant matter, the length of the delay was approximately three (3) weeks. In and 
of itself, this is not a significant delay. However, when compared with the fact that the alleged 
offenses against Jacobson are relatively minor and the additional fact that Jacobson twice 
invoked his speedy trial rights, a delay of three (3) weeks is less tolerable, especially when there 
is no evidence of Court congestion, witness unavailability or any other reason which might 
explain why any delay occurred at all. 
(d) Prejudice 
This factor weighs heavily in favor of Jacobson. The burden of proving good cause is on 
the State and the State did not prove that Jacobson was not prejudiced. It is the State's burden to 
prove prejudice not Jacobson's burden to disprove the same. 
In its briefing, the State relied on State v. Avila, 143 Idaho 849, 854,153 P.3d 1195, 1200 
(Ct. App. 2006), wherein this Court stated: "If a defendant does not even attempt to make a 
showing of a reasonable possibility of prejudice, this factor should be given a very light weight, 
if any, for the defendant." The State's reliance on Avila was error. Avila is a constitutional 
speedy trial case in which the Court simply balances the Barker factors to detennine if there is a 
speedy trial violation under the minimum protections of the constitution. In stark contrast, under 
I.C. § 19-3501, it is the State's burden to prove good cause and the State should likewise have 
the burden of proving lack of prejudice. By relying on Avila, the State merged constitutional and 




the clear terms of LC. § 19-3501 and thus, explicit Legislative directive. So much is proven by 
simply looking to the Court's ultimate holding on page nine (9) of its decision: 
Although Defendant, consistently and early in the proceedings, 
asserted his right to a speedy trial, this Court concludes that 
under the constitutional balancing test, a non-prejudicial delay 
of less than three weeks did not violate Defendant's right to a 
speedy trial. 
Memorandum Decision Re: Appeal, p. 9 (emphasis added). 
This is not the proper analysis under I.e. § 19-3501(4). Because it is the State's burden 
to prove good cause, the State should be forced to point to specific facts indicating lack of 
prejudice. It should thus not matter that a defendant initially did not come forward with evidence 
of actual prejudice. If the law were otherwise, defendants seeking to dismiss a case under 
I.e. § 19-3501(4) would effectively have the burden of disproving that which it was never their 
burden to prove in the first place. 
Here, the State did not prove that Jacobson was not prejudiced. It merely guessed that he 
was and attempted to shift the burden to Jacobson to prove otherwise. This may be appropriate 
under a Constitutional analysis of speedy trial. It is not appropriate, however, when the case is 
governed by a Legislative directive that states that it is the government's burden to prove good 
cause. As such, in light of the absence of evidence that Jacobson was not prejudiced, this factor 
also weighs in favor of Jacobson and in favor of dismissal. 
In sum, all but one of the Barker factors strongly mandates dismissal. Based on the 




Roos and REVERSE the decision filed by Judge Watkins, thereby dismissing all charges against 
Jacobson. 
B. This Court should reverse Judge Watkins under the following additional points, which 
were raised by the State in front of Judge Watkins. 
(a) The fact that a sworn complaint was demanded does not restart the time period for 
calculating speedy trial 
Before Judge Watkins, the State argued that the filing of the sworn complaint after 
Jacobson pled not guilty at his arraignment and not guilty through counsel, somehow operated to 
restart the time period for speedy trial. This is not the case since the sworn complaint filed did 
not add any new offenses and Jacobson already twice pled not guilty to the charges contained in 
the misdemeanor citations, with his first plea occurring in open court at Jacobson's arraignment. 
This Court has stated that "the time limitation [for speedy trial] is not renewed absent a formal 
dismissal and refiling of the original charges." State v. McKeeth, 136 Idaho 619, 627, 38 P.3d 
1275, 1283 (Ct. App. 2001). 
Moreover, speedy trial is not concerned with the time that a complaint is filed. It is 
concerned solely with when an individual first pleads not guilty. As such, for purposes of 
determining speedy trial, the time a formal complaint is filed is superfluous. 
Additionally, the State, at least below, put too much stock into the function of a 
complaint. In the typical case, a sworn complaint is requested simply to isolate the charges and 
acts alleged to constitute a violation of the relevant code provisions. Often times, complaints are 
provided as late as the day of trial. A party is not required to enter an additional plea in response 




Criminal Rule ("MCR") 3 ("A person may be charged and brought before a court for any citable 
offense upon the filing of an Idaho Uniform Citation"). Moreover, if the case were that a sworn 
complaint could restart speedy trial, a prosecutor in any case in which the defendant was charged 
by citation could simply issue a sworn complaint and thereby restart the clock for speedy trial. 
This would eviscerate I.C. § 19-3501 and the constitutional guarantees of a right to a speedy 
trial. 
(b) The fact that Jacobson filed an extension ohime to file pre-trial motions does not 
constitute any sort of waiver of Jacobson's right to a speedy trial 
An extension of time to file motions does not push out the time period by which a trial is 
to occur. It simply allows for additional time to examine discovery to adequately set forth 
potential motions to suppress or motions in limine and has no bearing on the trial date. Stuart, 
113 Idaho at 496, 745 P.2d at 1117 ("The six month time limitation for speedy trial under 
I.C. § 19-3501 does not represent a whimsical timeframe. It is designed to accommodate a 
reasonable number of pretrial motions '" Trial courts must be diligent in securing compliance 
with time restraints"). Moreover, since ISTARS automatically provides a trial date irrespective 
of such a motion, it is impossible that Jacobson's motion had any bearing on when the trial date 
was actually set. In fact, as the cause of the delay was the fact that the court clerk entered the 
wrong day from which to start speedy trial, it is undisputed that Jacobson's motion had no 




(c) The fact that the Motion to Dismiss was filed within the timeframe by which pre-
trial motions were to be filed is not significant 
I.C. § 19-3501(4) states that charges must be dismissed if the State fails to bring a 
defendant to trial within six months of the entry of a plea of not guilty. The lower court's trial 
order stated that pre-trial motions must be filed within twenty (20) days of the trial. The State 
argues that because Jacobson did not submit his motion in advance of the cut-off date, the 
motion should not have been heard. This is incorrect. First, the State' s argument would have the 
effect of having Judge Roos's trial order trump legislative and constitutional directive, both at 
the state and federal level. This aggrandizes court orders over state statute and constitutional 
law. In addition, if statutes and the constitution had to cede to trial orders, this would be a 
de facto amendment of I. C. § 19-3501 (4). The net effect would be that a party could assert his 
right to a speedy trial only if: (a) six (6) months lapsed, and (b) if filing a motion to dismiss did 
not violate the trial court's trial/scheduling order. This is not the law of Idaho and cannot have 
been the intent ofthe drafters. As such, the State's argument lacks merit. 
C. This Court should reverse Judge Watkins because the reasoning and analysis adopted 
improperly merges constitutional and statutory speedy trial law 
Judge Watkins' reasoning and the trajectory of this Court has been toward treating 
statutory and constitutional speedy trial rights as co-extensive. Even the most cursory 
examination of the genealogy of I.C. § 19-3501 jurisprudence bears out the slow and subtle 
erosion of statutory speedy trial rights to the point where analysis thereunder is, in fact, one in 




The court, unless good cause to the contrary is shown '" must 
order the prosecution or indictment to be dismissed '" [i]f a 
defendant, charged with a misdemeanor offense, whose trial has 
not been postponed upon his application. 
I.e. § 19-3501(4). The foregoing provision's constitutional counterpart provides that "[i]n all 
criminal prosecutions, the party accused shall have the right to a speedy ... trial." 
In detennining if a Constitutional violation occurred, our Court of Appeals applies a 
balancing test involving the four (4) factors discussed in Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514, 530 
(1972). However, as to I.e. § 19-3501(4), the Barker factors were originally oflimited relevance 
as the intent of the Legislature appears to have been to codify a statutory variant of speedy trial 
rights stricter than the minimum protections afforded by its constitutional predecessor. See e.g. 
Clark, 135 Idaho at 258, 16 P.3d at 934 ("[U]nder I.e. § 19-3501, criminal defendants are given 
additional protection beyond what is required by the United States and Idaho Constitutions"); 
See also Moore, 148 Idaho at 899, 231 P.3d at 544 ("Since it is a stricter standard, we will 
address the statutory speedy trial issue"). In fact, in cases following Barker v. Wingo, our Idaho 
Supreme Court expressly stated that the Barker factors were of no relevance to statutory speedy 
trial analysis: 
The district court mistakenly applied the four-fold balancing test 
for speedy trial claims enunciated by the United States Supreme 
Court in Barker v. Wingo, supra, in denying appellant's motion to 
dismiss. This ignores the legislative supplementation of the Idaho 
constitutional guarantee. I.C. § 19-3501. Barker v. Wingo, supra, 
is not applicable when I.e. § 19-3501 has been violated. The 
district court should have applied I.C. § 19-3501 and dismissed the 
action on that basis. 




Based on this Courts' recent decisions, Hobson is effectively no longer good law. By 
way of recall, in State v. Moore, this Court quite literally stated the opposite of the position taken 
by the Supreme Court in Hobson: 
[T]he analysis should focus upon the reason for the delay. But the 
reason for the delay cannot be evaluated entirely in a vacuum and a 
good cause determination may take into account the additional 
factors listed in Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514,530 (1972). Thus, 
insofar as they bear on the sufficiency or strength of the reason for 
the delay, a court may consider (1) the length of the delay; 
(2) whether the defendant asserted the right to a speedy trial; and 
(3) the prejudice to the defendant. However, the reason for the 
delay lies at the heart of a good cause determination under 
I.e. § 19-3501. 
148 Idaho 899, 231 P.3d at 544 (internal citations omitted). 
As near as can be gleaned, the only difference in speedy trial analysis under I.C. § 19-
3501 and state Constitution is that under the statutory analysis, the Barker factors "may" be 
applied. Moore, 148 Idaho at 899, 231 P.3d at 544 ("Thus, insofar as they bear on the 
sufficiency or strength of the reason for the delay, a court may consider ... [the remaining Barker 
factors r). Additionally, the reason for the delay appears to take on heightened significance. Id. 
However, this difference is illusory. Despite the permissive language adopted in determining 
whether the Barker factors should be considered in determining "good cause," the practical 
reality is that this Court applies the Barker factors as a matter of course. The validity of this 
point is borne out of simply looking to the analysis this Court has applied over the years. See 
State v. Lopez, supra (applying: (a) length of delay, (b) assertion of speedy trial rights, (c) reason 




had been violated); See also State v. Livas, 147 Idaho, 547, 550, 211 P .3d 792, 795 (CL App. 
2009) (relying heavily on the Barker factors despite applying a statutory speedy trial analysis); 
See also Moore, 148 Idaho at 900,231 P.3d at 545 (applying the Barker factors to a claim for 
speedy trial analysis under I.e. § 19-3501 and doing so in the precise same analytical format as 
in Lopez). 
Based on the foregoing authorities, it cannot honestly be said that under I.C. § 19-3501, 
the Barker factors are only permissibly applied or that the statutory speedy trial standard is 
stricter than the constitutional speedy trial standard. In application, they have become one in the 
same. Such gradual evisceration, from Hobson, to Clark, to Lopez, and finally, Moore, rings 
eerily similar to the now famous admonition of Justice Brennan in his dissenting opinion in 
United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897 (1984) as pertains to the Fourth Amendment: 
Since then, in case after case, I have witnessed the Court's gradual 
but determined strangulation of the rule. It now appears that the 
Court's victory over the Fourth Amendment is complete. 
468 U.S. at 928-29. 
It seems apparent that in enacting I.C. § 19-3501, our lawmakers intended to pass speedy 
trial laws stronger than the minimum protections afforded under state and federal constitutions. 
Since Hobson, our appellate courts have slowly distanced themselves from this intent. Jacobson 
invites the Court to re-examine its analysis of statutory speedy trial rights, but reiterates that if 






Jacobson respectfully requests that this Court AFFIRM Judge Roos's Order of Dismissal 
and REVERSE Judge Watkins' Memorandum Decision Re: Appeal and Order Re: Appeal. 
DATED this 16th day of November, 2011. 
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